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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review in Japan can be characterized as a failure in more than 
one sense. On the one hand, the Saikō saibansho, or Supreme Court of 
Japan (SCJ), strikes down government actions so rarely that the judicial 
enforcement of constitutional limits on government power exists more in 
theory than in practice. On the other hand, even on those rare occasions 
that the SCJ does exercise the power of judicial review, its practical ability 
to secure government compliance in all but the most trivial of cases is 
open to question. Over the course of its entire existence—a period 
spanning over six decades—the SCJ has struck down only eight laws on 
constitutional grounds1 and thus cemented its reputation as ―the most 
conservative and cautious in the world‖ with respect to the exercise of 
judicial review.2 By contrast, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, a 
slightly younger court, has already struck down over six hundred laws,3 
while the United States Supreme Court, with a docket similar in size to 
that of its Japanese counterpart,4 has struck down roughly nine hundred 
laws over the same time frame.5 Worse still, in the one area where the SCJ 
has struck down legislation of any political or ideological significance6—
 
 
 1. See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2009); Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1388–92 (2011). Nor has the SCJ made a habit of invalidating executive or 
administrative action on constitutional grounds. See id. at 1392–95. 
 2. DAVID BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 121 (1995). 
 3. See Germany’s Constitutional Court: Judgment Days, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2009, at 59 
(reporting that, since its creation in 1951, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht has struck down 611 
laws). 
 4. See Law, supra note 1, at 1577 & nn.191–92 (noting that both the United States Supreme 
Court and Japanese Supreme Court typically face a docket of roughly ten thousand cases per year). 
 5. From the 1953 through 2009 terms, the United States Supreme Court struck down on 
constitutional grounds a total of 262 acts of Congress, 566 state laws, and 68 local ordinances. See 
Harold Spaeth et al., 2010 Release 02, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data. 
php?s=2 (Aug. 26, 2010) (comprising a variable, ―UNCON,‖ that measures declarations of 
unconstitutionality). At an individual level, a number of Justices vote to strike down over half of the 
statutes that they confront. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of 
Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1774–76 & tbls.1, 2 (2007) (summarizing the voting 
records of the members of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in cases involving the invalidation of 
statutes). 
 6. See Law, supra note 1, at 1547 (summarizing ―the rare and often obscure legislative 
provisions that the Court has struck down‖); Matsui, supra note 1, at 1388–92 (describing each case in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/3
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namely, the electoral apportionment of the House of Representatives7—the 
government has failed for decades to comply with the Court‘s rulings.8  
This Article surveys and critically evaluates a wide range of historical, 
cultural, political, and institutional explanations for the effective failure of 
judicial review in Japan. Some accounts depict the judiciary as an 
 
 
which the SCJ has struck down a law, and noting that it has been ―rare‖ for the Court‘s holdings of 
unconstitutionality to have ―significant political implications‖). In his contribution to this Symposium, 
Professor Haley reaches a different conclusion. He argues, inter alia, that the SCJ cannot accurately be 
characterized as more deferential to other government actors than its American or European 
counterparts, and that the SCJ has in fact ―reached decisions that are considerably more ‗liberal‘ or 
‗libertarian‘‖ than those rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court. John O. Haley, Constitutional 
Adjudication in Japan: History and Social Context, Legislative Structures, and Judicial Values, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2011). In support of his argument that the SCJ has on occasion shown a 
―considerably more ‗liberal‘ or ‗libertarian‘‖ streak than its American counterpart, he cites a case in 
which the SCJ struck down a law that prevented pharmacies from operating within a certain distance 
from one another, and another in which the SCJ invalidated limits on the postal service‘s liability for 
losing registered mail. See id. Had the SCJ consciously set itself the goal of performing judicial review 
in a manner that bothers the government as little as possible, however, it would have been hard pressed 
to find a pair of more obscure or less important laws to invalidate. Nor do these cases begin to 
establish that the SCJ is anything other than conservative: the only sense in which the pharmacy case 
might be characterized as ―liberal‖ or ―libertarian‖ is in the sense epitomized by the Lochner Court and 
its reactionary favoritism toward economic liberty. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(striking down restrictions upon bakery working hours as an unconstitutional infringement upon 
freedom of contract). 
 7. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1985, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1100 (Kanao v. Hiroshima Election Mgmt. Comm’n); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 
1976, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 223 (Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election 
Control Comm’n).  
 8. In response to the Japanese Diet‘s ongoing failure to keep malapportionment of the House of 
Representatives within the limits set forth in Kurokawa, the Court has reiterated in a string of cases 
that the apportionment scheme remains unconstitutional, but it has consistently declined to order a 
remedy. See, e.g., William Somers Bailey, Reducing Malapportionment in Japan’s Electoral Districts: 
The Supreme Court Must Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 169, 178–81, 184 (1997) (discussing both the 
Court‘s malapportionment decisions subsequent to Kurokawa, and the ongoing inadequacy of the 
Diet‘s response); Law, supra note 1, at 1547–48 & n.11; Shigenori Matsui, The Reapportionment 
Cases in Japan: Constitutional Law, Politics, and the Japanese Supreme Court, 33 OSAKA U. L. REV. 
17, 30–36, 40–42 (1986) (noting the ―deep frustration‖ of many judges and commentators at the 
―continued failure of the Diet‖ to comply with the Court‘s legislative apportionment rulings); Court 
Contradictory on Vote Disparity, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://search.japantimes. 
co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101118a1.html (describing a pair of conflicting Tokyo High Court rulings on the 
constitutionality of the apportionment of the Diet‘s upper chamber, and noting that vote-value 
disparities have actually increased since the last election in 2007). Nor is electoral apportionment the 
only context in which the government has proven uncooperative with judicial rulings of 
unconstitutionality. See Law, supra note 1, at 1587 & n.257 (noting that it took nearly two decades for 
the Diet to comply with the Court‘s decision in the Parricide Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 
1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265, by repealing the provision that had been 
held unconstitutional); Craig Martin, Rule of Law Comes Under Fire: Government Response to High 
Court Ruling on SDF Operations in Iraq, JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 2008, available at http://search. 
japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20080503a1.html (describing the government‘s public vow to ignore a 
Nagoya High Court ruling that deemed Japan‘s air support operations in Iraq to be a violation of 
Article 9 but denied relief to the plaintiffs on standing grounds). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ideological ally or servant of a long-ruling conservative government.
9
 
Other explanations portray the judiciary‘s behavior as the product of 
extreme deference to the wishes of the government, or the public, or 
both.
10
 Still other accounts posit that, for reasons that are easily 
overlooked, the judiciary simply has not been confronted with many laws 
that are constitutionally suspect.
11
 Some of these arguments feature 
prominently in the existing scholarly literature on Japanese constitutional 
adjudication; others are not widely discussed and surfaced instead in the 
course of discussions with academics and off-the-record interviews with 
judges and other officials in Tokyo.12 This Article concludes by arguing 
that the SCJ is unlikely to discharge its responsibility for performing 
judicial review with greater vigor absent institutional reforms that reduce 
its dependence upon the bureaucracy for personnel and resources, and it 
discusses a number of reforms that might have such a liberating effect on 
the Court. 
II. CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
A. The Culture of the Kan 
Some have suggested that government officials, or kan, share a 
characteristic outlook, and that judges, as saibankan or ―court officials,‖ 
are no exception.13 This shared outlook can be distinguished, moreover, 
from mere partisanship or conventional left-right ideology. A number of 
the judges I interviewed were relatively quick to express distaste for the 
party that has ruled Japan for most of its postwar history, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), which they view as corrupt, if not also 
increasingly incompetent. At the same time, however, they feel a sense of 
 
 
 9. See infra Parts IV.A–IV.B. 
 10. See infra Parts IV.A & IV.C. 
 11. See infra Part V.A (discussing the argument that pre-enactment review of proposed 
legislation by Japan‘s Cabinet Legislation Bureau obviates judicial review). 
 12. The confidential interviews conducted by the author encompassed seven current and former 
members of the Japanese Supreme Court; two supreme court clerks, or chōsakan, who might be more 
accurately called research judges, see Masako Kamiya, ―Chōsakan‖: Research Judges Toiling at the 
Stone Fortress, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011); and four current or former lower-court judges, 
including Yasuaki Miyamoto and Haruhiko Abe, both of whom ran afoul very publicly of the judicial 
bureaucracy; see Law, supra note 1, at 1557 n.63, 1559, and have consented to be identified by name. 
Because the Washington University Law Review cannot verify the contents of the confidential 
interviews, the author takes sole responsibility for the accuracy of his citations to those interviews.  
 13. See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 126–27 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); Interview with 
Shinichi Nishikawa, Professor, Meiji University, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 20, 2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/3
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obligation to help maintain stability and have, at least in the past, 
experienced a reluctance to interfere with the government and bureaucracy 
that delivered the economic miracle of postwar Japan. Scholars, too, have 
argued that Japanese judges are imbued by their positions with a sense of 
both responsibility and restraint.14 
It may be true that many Japanese judges think this way, but the 
argument proves too much. The SCJ has not always toed the line. For 
example, under the leadership of Chief Justice Masatoshi Yokota, the 
Court rendered pro-labor decisions in the late 1960s that aroused the ire of 
conservatives and frustrated the government‘s efforts to prevent the public 
employee unions from striking.15 The LDP was, at the time, locked in a 
fierce political struggle with organized labor, which was a bastion of 
support for the Communists and Socialists. The Court did not change 
course until the subsequent appointment of the conservative Chief Justice 
Kazuto Ishida and several other like-minded justices.16 Its initial 
willingness to defy the LDP in a high-stakes struggle over the direction of 
postwar Japan demonstrates that not all judges possess an outlook that 
renders them unwilling to defy the government. 
B. Mainstream Japanese Political Culture 
One might argue that, to the extent that the SCJ approaches judicial 
review in a conservative manner, it does so simply because Japanese 
society is conservative, and the Justices who make up the Court are 
members of that society and share that sensibility. A number of judges 
suggested that the SCJ‘s behavior merely embodies the views and values 
of mainstream Japanese society. Notwithstanding a steady drumbeat of 
criticism from Japanese constitutional scholars—who tend to be politically 
progressive—it is plausible that the SCJ may actually be ―somewhat in 
line‖ with public opinion.17  
 
 
 14. See, e.g., HIROSHI ITOH, THE SUPREME COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN 
280 (2010); Haley, supra note 13, at 127–28. 
 15. See Law, supra note 1, at 1592–93; Matsui, supra note 1, at 1400–04; Setsuo Miyazawa, 
Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, 25 KOBE U. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991); Lawrence Repeta, 
Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713, 1728–29 (2011). 
 16. See Law, supra note 1, at 1592–93; Matsui, supra note 1, at 1400–04; Miyazawa, supra note 
15, at 57–58; Repeta, supra note 15, at 1735–39. 
 17. Interview with Takao Tanase, Professor, Chuo Law Sch., in Tokyo, Japan (June 26, 2008); 
see also, e.g., Haley, supra note 6, at 1471 (citing the LDP‘s dominance of postwar politics as 
evidence that ―the Japanese people overwhelmingly favor center-right political policies‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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There can be no doubt that many judges sincerely believe that their 
actions merely reflect the views of mainstream Japanese society. And it is 
both difficult and unrealistic to deny that judges behave in ways that 
reflect the values of the society to which they belong. Nevertheless, it 
seems unlikely that the conservatism of the SCJ can be so easily 
explained. Several interviewees expressed the seemingly contradictory 
view that Japan‘s judges are, as one Justice put it, ―aloof from daily and 
political life‖ and ―out of touch with regular people.‖18 It is difficult to see 
how the behavior of judges who are ―aloof‖ and ―out of touch‖ can be 
explained as the product of affinity with mainstream opinion. Likewise, it 
is hard to believe that Japanese political culture is so conservative as to 
entail the rejection of nearly every constitutional claim that comes before 
the SCJ. As in other countries, some constitutional plaintiffs happen to be 
highly sympathetic figures, such as the Christian widow who fought in 
vain to prevent a government-supported veterans‘ group from enshrining 
the spirit of her husband in a Shinto shrine.19 Finally, even if it is true that 
Japanese judges merely behave in sync with the political mainstream, that 
begs the question of why their role as guardians of the constitution almost 
never leads them to defy mainstream sentiment, as judges in other 
countries more often do. 
C. Cultural Aversion to Open Conflict 
A frequently offered explanation for the SCJ‘s reluctance to strike 
down laws is the concept of wa, which defies precise translation but refers 
roughly to a Japanese ideal of harmonious coexistence.20 On this account, 
one way in which the Japanese avoid conflict is by declining to take 
language literally, and judges behave in precisely such a manner when 
faced with seemingly unequivocal constitutional language. One Justice 
described the SCJ‘s failure to enforce the letter of Article 9, the pacifist 
 
 
 18. Interview with Justice E, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed). 
 19. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
277 (SDF Joint Enshrinement Case); see DAVID M. O‘BRIEN WITH YASUO OHKOSHI, TO DREAM OF 
DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 142–78 (1996). 
 20. See, e.g., Hideo Chikusa, Japanese Supreme Court—Its Institution and Background, 52 SMU 
L. REV. 1719, 1724 (1999) (arguing that the overcrowded character of Japanese society fosters a desire 
to avoid conflict and open disagreement, and attributing the preference for conciliation and settlement 
over litigation to this mindset); Shigenori Matsui, A Comment Upon the Role of the Judiciary in Japan, 
35 OSAKA U. L. REV. 17, 26 (1988) (describing, and rejecting, the argument that the ―Buddhist notion 
of ‗ichimiwagou‘ (everyone in harmony), an insistence on harmony by dedication of self to the 
society,‖ renders ―Western notions of right and individual‖ ―alien‖ to Japanese society).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] WHY HAS JUDICIAL REVIEW FAILED IN JAPAN? 1431 
 
 
 
 
provision of the postwar constitution,
21
 as the product of a 
characteristically Japanese way of dealing with legal principles and their 
application: the Japanese ―do believe in the power of words, but not in the 
literal meaning of words expressed.‖22 Another Justice offered evidence 
that such attitudes are deliberately inculcated in the judiciary. This Justice 
explained that, during his time as an instructor at the Legal Research and 
Training Institute (LRTI)—which provides mandatory training to 
everyone who passes the bar, including judges, lawyers, and prosecutors 
alike23—he sought to train would-be judges to value harmony and 
reconciliation over candor. In his words: ―Communication with other 
people is most important. What is true comes second.‖24 
There are a number of reasons to view wa-based explanations for the 
near-absence of judicial review with suspicion. First, invoking cultural 
norms is a way for judges to shift responsibility for their own behavior to 
the culture at large. A judge‘s choice to uphold the status quo and avoid 
rocking the boat at the expense of vindicating constitutional rights is 
precisely that—a choice. And it is a choice that cannot be reduced to a 
matter of compliance with cultural norms. Culture does not dictate such 
choices; Japanese judges are no more slaves to cultural mores than 
American judges are. Instead, conservatives can be expected to invoke the 
concept of wa precisely because the status quo is already to one‘s liking. 
As one Japanese legal scholar put it, elites invoke the notion of wa to 
discourage others from disagreeing openly with them.25 To insist upon wa 
is tantamount to rejecting disagreement, and thus to enshrining the status 
quo. It is therefore convenient and self-serving for conservatives to 
respond to disagreement by appealing to the notion of wa, simply because 
they are in power; conversely, it is unlikely that the Communists would 
ever do so as long as they remain out of power.  
 
 
 21. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] art. 9; see infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 22. Interview with Justice E, supra note 18. It has been argued that this aversion to literalistic 
interpretation is rooted not simply in Japanese culture, but in the language itself. Because Japanese 
characters have multiple meanings and ―spoken words change meaning depending on context,‖ 
suggests Professor O‘Brien, ―the Japanese expect less precision.‖ O‘BRIEN, supra note 19, at 29. 
Moreover, as a matter of culture, ―indirection, vagueness, and ambiguity are regarded as polite and 
respectful.‖ Id. at 30. The result, he argues, is that the Japanese are ―tolerant of ambiguity, elasticity, 
and discretionary applications of legal documents.‖ Id. 
 23. See Law, supra note 1, at 1552. 
 24. Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed).  
 25. Interview with Masako Kamiya, Professor, Gakushuin Univ. Law Sch., in Tokyo, Japan 
(June 27, 2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, broad-brush cultural explanations of the wa variety run the risk 
of relying upon inaccurate or outdated stereotypes. As scholars have 
repeatedly observed, it is simply not the case that Japanese political life is 
characterized by an absence of conflict or a penchant for harmony, as 
illustrated vividly by the breadth and intensity of the conflict that occurred 
in the 1960s over Japanese labor relations and security arrangements with 
the United States,26 or by the years of armed resistance mounted by local 
farmers to the construction of Tokyo‘s Narita Airport.27 Cultural 
explanations that essentially rest upon stereotypes about ―the Japanese‖ 
must be taken with a grain of salt, lest we exoticize behavior in lieu of 
explaining it.  
Third, resort to cultural explanations risks circularity and raises more 
questions than it answers. Culture is as much a consequence as a cause of 
behavior: if anything, it is not culture that explains behavior, but rather 
behavior that defines culture. To say that a cultural norm or consensus 
drives behavior merely begs the question of why people uphold the norm 
or consensus instead of destabilizing or subverting it. The patterns of 
behavior that come over time to be understood as cultural are themselves 
malleable and contingent. At the turn of the twentieth century, for 
example, it was possible for Japanese employers to criticize their workers 
as lazy, spendthrift, and disloyal when compared to American workers.
28
 It 
 
 
 26. See J. PATRICK BOYD & RICHARD J. SAMUELS, NINE LIVES?: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN JAPAN 23–25 (2005) (discussing the uproar over the 1960 revision of 
Japan‘s mutual security treaty with the United States, which generated ―the largest mass protests in 
Japan‘s postwar history‖ and eventually forced Prime Minister Kishi‘s resignation); MASUMI 
JUNNOSUKE, CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN JAPAN 361–66 (Lonny E. Carlile trans., 1995) (discussing 
the Mitsui Miike coal mine strike in March 1960, the biggest labor dispute in Japanese postwar 
history); John O. Haley, Waging War: Japan’s Constitutional Constraints, 14 CONST. F. 18, 23–28 
(2005) (describing the protracted litigation and power struggles within the judiciary over the 
constitutionality of Japan‘s security arrangements); supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court‘s shifting stance on the politically charged question of the ability of public 
employees to engage in mass strikes). Keidanren, the umbrella organization of Japanese big 
businesses, collaborated with the management of the mine, while workers from around the country 
made the pilgrimage to join a picket line that was twenty thousand strong. No less than ten thousand 
police and fifteen thousand union members faced each other down when Mitsui sought to reopen the 
mine two months into the strike. See JUNNOSUKE, supra, at 365. 
 27. See DAVID E. APTER & NAGAYO SAWA, AGAINST THE STATE: POLITICS AND SOCIAL 
PROTEST IN JAPAN 79–109 (1984) (describing, inter alia, the construction of fortified tunnels, 
barricades, and moats filled with human feces, and the armed takeover of the airport‘s control tower, 
by farmers and militants opposed to the appropriation of land for the airport). 
 28. Gerald Curtis tells the apt story of Sakutaro Kobayishi, the founder of a company called 
Tokyo Shibaura Denki, now known as Toshiba. Visiting the United States in 1908, Kobayishi was 
deeply impressed by the work ethic and company loyalty of American workers as compared to the 
stubborn, disloyal, inflexible workers with whom he was accustomed to dealing in his native Japan. 
Comparing them to their American counterparts, a frustrated Kobayishi said of his Japanese workers: 
―Teaching them anything is like trying to teach a cat to chant the nembutsu [Buddhist prayers].‖ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/3
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is doubtful that anyone would speak of Japanese cultural traits in the same 
manner now.  
D. The Non-Axial Character of Japanese Society 
It could also be argued that Japanese culture lacks the religious or 
philosophical foundation necessary for judges to stake out absolute or 
strongly principled positions on constitutional questions. In this vein, 
Japan might be characterized as a non-axial society, meaning that the 
normative regulation of behavior does not rest upon binding moral axioms 
or claims of higher or transcendental truth.29 Japanese society is not 
Christian; nor is it Kantian, or otherwise inclined toward moral 
absolutism. As a practical matter, the guides to correct action in Japanese 
society are consensus and relationships of status, not higher truth of the 
type that one might glean from an authoritative text—be it biblical or 
constitutional.
30
  
The existence of social conditions radically different from those that 
spawned political liberalism, as well as a legacy of Confucianism, lend 
support to this account of the character of Japanese social and political 
reasoning. Western liberal political thought reflects the costly lessons of 
centuries of religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants. In 
response, a set of political and legal institutions and mechanisms for the 
peaceful coexistence of people with irreconcilable beliefs developed under 
the intellectual umbrella of liberalism.31 A political system founded on the 
impossibility of religious consensus does not contemplate consensus as a 
basis for political decision making. However, in the absence of sizeable 
and powerful religious, ethnic, or linguistic minorities, it is not surprising 
 
 
GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LIMITS OF 
CHANGE 12 (1999). Kobayishi also praised Americans for saving their earnings, unlike his fellow 
countrymen. See id. As Curtis observes, ―Americans now have the lowest savings rate of any 
industrialized country and Japanese are criticized for saving too much.‖ Id. 
 29. I am originally indebted to Stephen Givens for this insight. John Haley makes a similar point 
in his contribution to this Symposium. See Haley, supra note 6, at 1471 (identifying a ―relative lack of 
a widely shared belief among the Japanese in universally applicable moral imperatives‖ and observing 
that ―East Asian legal traditions never developed a notion of ―natural law‖ or a notional nexus between 
law and morality‖). 
 30. See id. at 1471 (arguing that ―[c]ommunity norms, not transcendental norms, are what 
matters‖).  
 31. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (1999) 
(noting that ―political liberalism was partly invented in response to religious claims that some ways of 
believing should be suppressed‖). 
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that consensus might both prove more attainable and assume greater 
weight in Japanese society than in most other liberal democracies.
32
  
The absence of a sense of higher truth, combined with the 
corresponding importance of hierarchy and consensus, has political and 
legal implications. On the one hand, Japanese courts have little moral or 
intellectual heritage upon which to draw if they wish to resist the wishes of 
the majority or the government. The absence of religiosity and moral 
absolutism—and, with it, the absence of the notion of binding 
commandment or scripture—gives judges little basis to resist a strongly 
positivistic civil law tradition.
33
 On the other hand, that same positivistic 
civil law tradition, with its narrow conception of the role of judges, firmly 
places the courts in a hierarchically inferior position to the Diet and the 
Cabinet when it comes to the creation of legal norms.
34
 
Consistent with this line of argument, one Justice did suggest that the 
SCJ‘s approach to the interpretation of constitutional principles may in 
fact be influenced in a deep way by Japan‘s religious and moral heritage.35 
In explaining why the SCJ has repeatedly allowed the government so 
much leeway in the area of legislative apportionment, this Justice opined 
that ―equality,‖ in the context of voting rights and elsewhere, is for the 
Japanese a ―relative, not absolute‖ concept, whereas Christians and 
Buddhists subscribe to a ―more absolute concept of equality‖ that may 
make them less inclined to tolerate disparities.
36
  
Even if cultural traditions at such a high level of abstraction are 
relevant to judicial behavior, it is implausible that such traditions can fully 
account for the SCJ‘s reluctance to exercise the power of judicial review. 
 
 
 32. This is not to suggest that Japanese society is wholly homogeneous; Japan certainly has its 
share of minorities who experience varying degrees of discrimination, such as the historically outcast 
burakumin, indigenous peoples such as the Ainu and native Okinawans, and those of Chinese or 
Korean descent. Thus far, however, such groups have not proven capable of generating and sustaining 
large-scale social conflict. 
 33. See Saïd Amir Arjomand, Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order: A Study in the 
Modernization of Political Traditions, 33 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENES DE SOCIOLOGIE 39, 43–44 (1992) 
(suggesting that the notion of inviolable individual rights presumes the ―transcendence of justice 
introduced by Christianity‖ and foundation of natural law furnished by Christian theology); id. at 53 
(observing that, as a historical matter, the absence of the ―sacred law of a world religion‖ from the 
traditional Japanese normative order has resulted in an absence of ―tension between man-made and 
transcendent law‖). 
 34. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that the civil law tradition does not 
contemplate a lawmaking role for judges but tends instead to ―diminish the judge and glorify the 
legislator‖). 
 35. Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed). 
 36. Id. 
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The growing global consensus in favor of judicial review
37
 and the 
ubiquity of ―rights talk‖ in legal and political discourse everywhere38 make 
it increasingly difficult to argue that judicial review has failed in Japan for 
lack of an adequate normative foundation. If the Justices of the Japanese 
Supreme Court have failed to embrace their role as enforcers of the 
constitution with the same enthusiasm as courts elsewhere, that is because 
they have chosen not to embrace it, not because the non-axial character of 
Japanese society prevents them from doing so. The manner in which 
cultural traditions influence judicial behavior reflects the exercise of 
―choice by those with the power to make and implement such choices 
about which traditions to maintain and which to discard and then how to 
maintain or foster those chosen.‖39 To rely upon a cultural explanation of 
Japanese judicial behavior is both to excise the role of individual choice 
from judicial policymaking and to absolve Japanese judges of 
responsibility for their decisions.  
III. HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS 
A. The Postwar Legacy of the Meiji Era 
A number of judges attributed the present-day conservatism of the 
Japanese judiciary in part to the legacy of the Meiji era.40 Under the Meiji 
Constitution, Japan‘s judges were under the direction and control of the 
Hōmushō, or Ministry of Justice, and behaved in a correspondingly 
cautious, conservative, and bureaucratic way. The postwar constitution 
freed the judiciary from this outside control and ordained various 
American-style guarantees of judicial independence.
41
 However, unlike 
officials in other branches of the government, the judges of the ancien 
 
 
 37. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (documenting the growing global popularity of judicial review). 
 38. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 11–12 (1991) (―In the years since the end of World War II, ‗rights‘ have entered 
importantly into the cultural schemes of meaning of peoples everywhere. . . . All over the world, 
political discourse is increasingly imbued with the language of rights, universal, inalienable, 
inviolable.‖).  
 39. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 221 (1987). 
 40. E.g., Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed) (observing that the Court has failed to make a ―clean break‖ with the 
―conservative‖ prewar system); Interview with Haruhiko Abe, Attorney & Retired Judge, in Tokyo, 
Japan (July 16, 2008); accord Interview with Yoshitomo Ode, Professor of Law, Tokyo Keizai 
University, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 6, 2008). 
 41. See Haley, supra note 13, at 117–19. 
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régime were not purged following the war.
42
 Instead, the liberation of the 
judiciary from the Ministry of Justice created a power vacuum that these 
conservative holdover judges were ultimately able to fill. According to one 
critically minded judge, the ―old guard‖ temporarily lost sway but soon 
reasserted itself by gaining control over the LRTI and thus over the 
training and hiring of new judges.
43
 A variation on this story is that the 
judiciary behaves conservatively in order to preserve its hard-won 
institutional autonomy: on this account, the judges who run the judiciary 
prize their autonomy so highly that they are careful not to allow anything 
to happen that might antagonize the government and invite political 
interference within their fiefdom.
44
  
Even on its face, this explanation for the SCJ‘s aversion to judicial 
review does not tell the whole story. The problem lies in the fact that 
conservatives did, for a brief period, lose their dominance of the judiciary. 
In order to say that the Court‘s current behavior reflects the legacy of the 
Meiji era, one must first explain how that legacy was restored after it had 
been disrupted. If conservatives regained control of the judiciary only with 
the help of political intervention, as Setsuo Miyazawa has suggested,
45
 
then it is the political intervention, not the shadow of the Meiji era, that 
truly explains the Court‘s behavior. Alternatively, if a fear of jeopardizing 
the judiciary‘s precious independence is what leads the Court to restrain 
itself, then it must be asked what prompted the Court to rediscover that 
fear after a liberal interlude—or, indeed, why the Court ever overcame that 
fear in the first place. 
B. Judges as ―Second-Class Bureaucrats‖ 
A related explanation for the failure of judicial review is that Japan‘s 
judges have historically been ―second-class bureaucrats‖ who have lacked 
either the will or the ability to stand up to the executive or legislature. In 
 
 
 42. See Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 57; sources cited supra note 40. 
 43. Interview with Haruhiko Abe, supra note 40; see Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 57 (observing 
that postwar changes to Japanese legal education ―brought in more independent-minded, liberal judges 
into the judiciary,‖ but subsequent changes in ―the political climate around 1968 . . . allowed 
conservative judges to regain control‖). 
 44. See Interview with Hidenori Tomatsu, Professor, Gakushuin Univ. Law Sch., in Tokyo, 
Japan (July 17, 2008). 
 45. See Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 57–59 (observing that the argument that the current ―system 
of administrative control‖ reflects ―the legacy of prewar organizational culture‖ ―assumes the impact 
of political factors that allowed [this] legacy . . . to resurface,‖ and attributing the judiciary‘s rightward 
shift to the appointment of Kazuto Ishida as Chief Justice, following ―pressure from conservative 
politicians‖ to correct the Court‘s liberal trajectory). 
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the words of one Justice, the judiciary was historically a second-class 
member of the Japanese bureaucracy: ―The cream reached the top, but by 
and large, judges were second-class bureaucrats.‖46 As startling as it may 
be to hear a Japanese Supreme Court Justice deride the competence and 
courage of the Japanese judiciary, these views merely echo those of 
another prominent jurist, former Chief Justice Kouichi Yaguchi. Yaguchi, 
who is often credited with raising the quality and prestige of the judiciary, 
offered these sentiments shortly before his death in 2006: 
You folks look at the post-war judiciary, and you say the Japanese 
judiciary should use its authority and power to declare laws 
unconstitutional more often. But how can a second-class 
bureaucracy perform that kind of responsibility, even if given that 
responsibility by the Constitution? Maybe now the judiciary is in a 
more spirited position to state its views. There is no future for the 
Japanese judiciary if it doesn‘t do that.47 
When asked specifically whether he agreed that Japanese judges are 
timid because they are ―second-class bureaucrats,‖ one justice deemed it 
―kind of true‖;48 another, who had spent his entire working life as a judge, 
called it ―half true.‖49 A number of interviewees opined that the prestige 
and attractiveness of a career in the judiciary has increased over the last 
few decades. All agreed, however, that as a historical matter, the top 
graduates of Japan‘s top universities have not always favored a career in 
the judiciary.50 For several decades, the best and brightest sought jobs 
either in other government ministries or in top corporations. In the private 
sector, they favored such companies as Nippon Steel, Tokio Marine, and 
Mitsubishi Bank. On the government side, high-prestige ministries 
included Finance, Foreign Affairs, and subsequently MITI (now METI), 
International Trade, and, after the war, Agriculture as well, while the 
―residue‖ went to the judiciary.51 The prewar domination of the judiciary 
 
 
 46. Interview with Justice D, supra note 35; see also ITOH, supra note 14, at 31 (citing Louis 
Favoreu‘s argument that career judges in civil law countries such as France, Germany, and Japan 
―often lack the power and skill‖ to challenge legislative or executive officials). 
 47. SHINGO MIYAKE, SHIJŌ TO HO [MARKETS AND LAW] 282 (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 2007) 
(quoting Chief Justice Yaguchi). The English version of the quotation given here is a transcription of 
the oral translation provided by a former Justice.  
 48. Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed). 
 49. Interview with Justice G, supra note 35. 
 50. Interview with Justice A, supra note 24; Interview with Justice B, supra note 48; Interview 
with Justice D, supra note 35. 
 51. Interview with Justice D, supra note 35. 
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by the Ministry of Justice certainly did not help to enhance the prestige of 
the judiciary. The net result has been, supposedly, a corps of judges who 
have been unable or unwilling to challenge legislation devised by elite 
bureaucrats in other agencies and rubber-stamped by the legislature.  
The notion that Japanese judges are ―second-class bureaucrats‖ seems 
inconsistent with the portrait of the judiciary that some scholars have 
painted, and in particular with the emphasis that has sometimes been 
placed upon the educationally elitist character of the judiciary.52 As many 
have noted, the judiciary has historically been well stocked with graduates 
of prestigious universities.
53
 Yet relevant differences exist even among the 
most elite schools. Although the University of Tokyo (―Todai‖) and Kyoto 
University (―Kyodai‖) are both highly prestigious universities that produce 
substantial numbers of judges. Todai‘s prestige exceeds that of Kyodai.54 
However, Kyodai‘s representation in the judiciary has been 
disproportionately greater than that of Todai.
55
 Notwithstanding Kyodai‘s 
own prestige, its graduates may have perceived themselves to be at a 
disadvantage relative to Todai graduates in the competition for 
government employment. This feeling of being ―a little lower,‖ suggested 
one former judge, may have led them to seek positions in the judiciary, 
where they may have felt at less of a disadvantage owing to its somewhat 
less prestigious position in the government hierarchy.
56
 Such self-selection 
has the potential to become self-reinforcing, as old-boy networks facilitate 
the entry and advancement of future Kyodai graduates (although, as 
Professor Ramseyer‘s contribution to this Symposium demonstrates, 
school ties may ultimately be no substitute for actual productivity).
57
 
Meanwhile, certain universities widely considered to be at least as 
prestigious as Kyodai—in particular, Keio and Waseda—have never 
placed a graduate on the SCJ, a fact that more than one interviewee found 
both noteworthy and aberrational. 
A number of interviewees, both judicial and academic, opined that the 
prestige and attractiveness of a career in the judiciary has increased since 
 
 
 52. Haley, supra note 13, at 109, 115. 
 53. Id. at 108; Setsuo Miyazawa, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL‘Y J. 1, 22–24 (2000). 
 54. See Miyazawa, supra note 53, at 23; J. Mark Ramseyer, Do School Cliques Dominate 
Japanese Bureaucracies?: Evidence from Supreme Court Appointments, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1681, 
1683 (2011) (describing the University of Tokyo as traditionally ―preeminent . . . in nearly all 
academic departments,‖ with Kyoto University ranking second). 
 55. Miyazawa, supra note 53, at 23. 
 56. Interview with Haruhiko Abe, supra note 40. 
 57. See Ramseyer, supra note 57, at 1682 (finding only ―weak‖ statistical evidence of favoritism 
toward Kyodai graduates in the judiciary).  
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the war and, in particular, under Chief Justice Yaguchi‘s tenure. Yaguchi‘s 
views regarding the inferiority of judges, suggested one Justice, rang true 
for members of Yaguchi‘s own generation but reflected an ―old way of 
thinking.‖58 It is also true that, partly to compensate for its legacy as a 
second-class bureaucracy, postwar reforms made judges the best paid of 
all government employees.59 By all accounts, however, the bench is 
chronically understaffed, and the recruitment of qualified new judges 
poses a severe challenge. Indeed, those interviewees with experience in 
judicial personnel matters uniformly identified recruitment as the most 
pressing challenge that they faced, and they bemoaned in particular the 
extent to which increasingly lucrative opportunities in the private sector 
have made it increasingly difficult to recruit capable new judges. A 
number of academic interviewees, meanwhile, speculated that, given the 
range of attractive opportunities available to the elite few capable of 
passing the bar, those who self-select into a lifelong judicial career are 
likely to be highly conservative and risk averse in character. 
The difficulty of recruiting talented, dynamic judges is only aggravated 
by the fact that, like most civil law countries, Japan has a career 
judiciary.60 The vast majority of its judges join the bench immediately 
after completing their LRTI training, without an opportunity to first reap 
the financial benefits of the private sector. The seniority-based career 
advancement path of Japanese judges, combined with a mandatory 
retirement age of sixty-five for regular judges (seventy for members of the 
SCJ), makes it essential for those who wish to reach the highest echelons 
of the judiciary to embark upon their careers at a young age.
61
 As a result, 
would-be judges face an even starker choice between financial comfort 
and a judicial career in Japan than they do in the United States or other 
common law jurisdictions, where judges are often individuals who have 
already established themselves financially.  
Career judges are at more than just a financial disadvantage relative to 
their common law counterparts. In common law countries, a typical judge 
has already enjoyed a successful career in private practice or public 
service (or both) prior to joining the bench and thus possesses a 
considerable measure of confidence, experience, and personal reputation. 
 
 
 58. Interview with Justice A, supra note 24. 
 59. See Miyazawa, supra note 53, at 22. 
 60. See Law, supra note 1, at 1551–59 (describing the career path for Japanese judges, from their 
initial training and recruitment to the prospect of promotion to the Supreme Court); David S. Law, 
How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779, 798 & n.69 (2011) (citing Japan, Chile, France, and 
Italy as examples of countries with career judiciaries). 
 61. See Law, supra note 1, at 1552 n.26. 
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Having embarked upon their judicial careers fresh out of school, by 
contrast, Japanese judges are unlikely to possess such qualities in 
abundance. One Justice who had himself been a career judge alluded to 
this fact in explaining why Japanese judges might feel reluctant to 
substitute their own judgment for that of the government. As he put it, a 
young judge who has literally just graduated from judge school must ask 
himself: why should anyone—especially smart, experienced people in 
other branches of government—listen to me?62 Even if a particular young 
judge wants to ―change the world,‖ he added, the judge in question will be 
―trained to require strong evidence before acting on his wishes.‖63  
C. The Alien Character of Judicial Review 
It has suggested that the SCJ has historically exercised the power of 
judicial review with extreme restraint because judicial review was, from 
the perspective of the typical Japanese judge, an ―alien transplant.‖64 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the American occupation authorities to 
instill a sense of judicial supremacy by way of the postwar constitution, 
Japanese judges simply were not accustomed to striking down laws on 
constitutional grounds. One Justice expressed the view that the notions of 
judicial review and judicial supremacy have, after some time, finally taken 
hold among the people and the judges alike, and that we should therefore 
expect to see the SCJ behave in a more active fashion in years to come.
65
  
Even on its face, this explanation is not especially persuasive. Other 
countries have introduced judicial review more recently than Japan did and 
have reaped much more dramatic results within a much shorter period of 
time. Canada, for example, did not patriate its Constitution until 1982. 
Prior to that time, parliamentary sovereignty was the rule in both theory 
and practice, and there was no precedent for judicial review in the British 
legal tradition that Canada inherited.
66
 Almost immediately, however, the 
 
 
 62. Interview with Justice G, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Interview with Justice A, supra note 24; see also Matsui, supra note 1, at 1400 (describing 
the unfamiliarity of the SCJ‘s initial membership with judicial review as the ―root cause‖ of its current 
―passivism‖ and observing that the ―German positivist jurisprudence‖ in which the first members of 
the Court were steeped contained ―no tradition‖ of constitutional review). 
 65. See Interview with Justice A, supra note 24. 
 66. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 
79 (2010) (noting that Canada still retains the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to some extent, in 
the form of a constitutional provision that allows for legislative override of most rights found in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
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Supreme Court of Canada began to strike down important laws at a rate 
that far outstrips that of its Japanese counterpart.67 Even more striking is 
the example of France, which adopted a limited form of judicial review 
over a decade later than Japan against a backdrop of widespread and 
longstanding hostility to the idea of le gouvernement des juges, or a 
government of judges.
68
 Like Japan, France combines a civil law tradition 
that minimizes the lawmaking role of judges
69
 with pre-enactment review 
of proposed legislation by an elite administrative agency that might, at 
least in theory, be expected to reduce the need for further review of a 
judicial variety.
70
 Nevertheless, the French Conseil Constitutionnel has 
historically found constitutional defects in over one-third of the laws that it 
has reviewed. 71 
 
 
 67. See F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION & THE COURT PARTY 30 
(2000). 
 68. See ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23 (1992) (characterizing hostility to judicial review in 
France as ―a dominant ideological dogma of political life‖); id. at 39–40 (describing the ―incredible 
impact‖ of Edouard Lambert‘s condemnation of American-style judicial review as le gouvernement 
des juges). Until very recently, there was no judicial mechanism in France by which individuals could 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute: such challenges could be brought only by certain categories 
of government officials, and only before actual promulgation of the statute in question. See Gerald L. 
Neuman, Anti-Ashwander: Constitutional Litigation as a First Resort in France, 43 NYU J. INT‘L L. & 
POL. 15, 15–22 (2010) (describing the original limits upon the jurisdiction of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel and the implementation in 2010 of a ―preliminary reference procedure‖ that enables it 
to decide constitutional questions raised by ordinary litigants).  
 69. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 56 (3d ed. 2007) (observing 
that the defining characteristics of the civil law tradition—such as ―[l]egislative positivism,‖ a 
dogmatic approach to the separation of powers, and ―the ideology of codification‖—―all tend to 
diminish the judge and glorify the legislator‖). 
 70. See infra Part V.A (comparing the Japanese Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku, or Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau, with the French Conseil d’État). 
 71. See STONE, supra note 68, at 121 tbl.5.1 (reporting that, from 1974 to 1987, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel annulled or amputated 49 out of the 92 laws that it reviewed); Raphaël Franck, 
Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional 
Court, 1959–2006, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 262, 265 (2008) (indicating that, from 1959 to 2006, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel found 124 of the 317 laws and treaties that it reviewed to be unconstitutional). 
When left-leaning governments are in power, the Conseil Constitutionnel becomes even more active. 
See id. at 265–67 (noting that the Conseil Constitutionnel invalidated 97 out of the 209 laws and 
treaties that it reviewed during periods of left-wing rule). Between January and May of 1981 alone, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel rejected five of the ten major reforms enacted by the newly elected Socialist 
government. See F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 89, 94–95 (1988).  
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D. The Impact of the Cold War 
Another historical explanation that deserves attention is the impact of 
the Cold War. With its written guarantees of a minimum standard of living 
and public education,72 the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively,73 and an explicit commitment to pacifism,74 the postwar 
Nihonkoku Kenpō might be considered a last monument to New Deal 
liberalism before the weight of the Cold War settled upon civil liberties in 
Japan and the United States alike. It is no doubt true, as a number of 
interviewees argued, that many government elites in Japan felt the 
suppression of communism to be a matter of national survival, and that 
many judges, in particular, may have considered it necessary to sacrifice 
rigorous enforcement of constitutional rights to that end. The United States 
Supreme Court is often said to have capitulated in the face of 
McCarthyism and the Red Scare.
75
 Yet the threat of communism was, if 
anything, more palpable in Japan, which found itself in the perilous 
situation of having the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea for 
neighbors. 
The concern that many senior judges shared with other elite 
government officials, emphasized one Justice, was the spread of 
communism. Domestically, the Communist Party had strong ties to an 
active and powerful labor movement.
76
 Beyond Japan‘s borders, the region 
was increasingly unfriendly terrain for capitalist democracy. China and 
North Korea fell under communist control; South Korea and Taiwan were 
democratic more in name than in practice; Thailand was subject to 
constant coups. Meanwhile, well into the 1980s, Japanese elites were 
convinced that they faced a powerful Soviet Union bent on infiltrating and 
subverting Japan‘s pro-American government.77 Through the Cold War, 
the Japanese judiciary was not ideologically monolithic; it contained both 
defenders of pacifism and members of the Socialist Party. These judges 
did not, however, prevail in the judiciary‘s internal power struggles.78 
 
 
 72. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 25, para. 1 (―All people shall have the 
right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.‖). 
 73. Id. art. 28, para. 1 (―The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is 
guaranteed.‖). 
 74. Id. art. 9. 
 75. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 76. See Interview with Justice D, supra note 35. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
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The impact of the Cold War on Japanese constitutional jurisprudence 
may have been greatest in the areas of voting rights and freedom of 
expression. In the face of massive migration from the countryside to the 
cities, the Japanese Diet became increasingly malapportioned, and this 
malapportionment favored rural areas over urban ones. Rural 
constituencies were largely conservative and formed the electoral power 
base of the LDP; urban areas, by comparison, were strongholds of the left 
and prone to unrest.79 In the name of political ―stability,‖ suggested one 
Justice, the LDP was ―permitted by the people‖ to benefit from electoral 
malapportionment that kept it in power at the expense of voting rights.
80 
Labor rights and freedom of expression cases, meanwhile, were 
high-profile battlegrounds between the left and the right. An influential 
administrative law judge who participated in high-profile cases in the SCJ 
in his capacity as a senior chōsakan admitted that he could not bring 
himself to sympathize with the plaintiffs in the freedom of expression and 
political pamphleteering cases that came before him because they were all 
Communists.
81 
Like the ―second-class bureaucracy‖ explanation, the Cold War 
geopolitical explanation for the conservatism of the SCJ is an interesting 
one that most likely contains at least a grain of truth but, at the same time, 
clearly fails to tell the whole story. Even if it is true that the Cold War 
helps to explain a substantial portion of the SCJ‘s constitutional 
jurisprudence, the Cold War has by now been over for some time. Nothing 
could more dramatically underscore the demise of Cold War politics in 
Japan than the fact that, in 1993, the LDP engineered a coalition 
government with the head of the Socialist Party as Prime Minister.82 The 
 
 
 79. See GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS 19–20 (1988) (noting that, ―by the 
end of the 1960s,‖ Japan was home to ―an impressive array of urban protest movements and of local 
government leaders backed by the opposition parties‖); ETHAN SCHEINER, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT 
COMPETITION IN JAPAN: OPPOSITION FAILURE IN A ONE-PARTY DOMINANT STATE 57–58, 162–63 
(2006) (discussing the LDP‘s reliance on rural and agricultural support, and observing that electoral 
malapportionment in favor of rural areas ―probably even allowed the LDP to win a majority of seats in 
years when a correctly apportioned system would not have‖); Yoshio Sugimoto, Quantitative 
Characteristics of Popular Disturbances in Post-Occupation Japan (1952–1960), 37 J. ASIAN STUD. 
273, 278, 281 (1978) (showing statistically that ―labor union members were the spearhead of popular 
disturbances,‖ which tended to be concentrated in ―highly populated prefectures in the ‗industrial belt‘ 
along the Pacific Coast‖).  
 80. Interview with Justice D, supra note 35. 
 81. Interview with Anonymous Source, in Tokyo, Japan (June 27, 2008) (describing a 
confidential conversation with the judge in question). 
 82. See CURTIS, supra note 28, at 21–22, 195–96 (describing the political machinations by which 
Tomiichi Murayama, chairman of the Socialist Party, became Prime Minister in coalition with the 
LDP). 
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United States Supreme Court discovered a more liberal footing in the 
aftermath of the McCarthy era; there is no obvious reason why the SCJ 
could not have done so as well once any plausible threat of communism 
had passed.  
Another problem with the Cold War argument—and, indeed, with all 
historical explanations of judicial conservatism in Japan—is, quite simply, 
that the judiciary has not always behaved conservatively. In 1947, when 
the SCJ was first established, the Socialist Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama 
and his cabinet appointed the first fifteen justices to serve on the Court, 
and in its first three years under Chief Justice Mibuchi, the SCJ struck a 
somewhat liberal tone.
83
 Subsequently, under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Masatoshi Yokota in the late 1960s, the SCJ rendered landmark 
labor decisions that shielded public employees from prosecution for 
participating in strikes and greatly bolstered the power of the 
Socialist-influenced public employee unions, to the outrage of 
conservatives.
84
 Neither the pressures of the Cold War nor the judiciary‘s 
supposed status as a ―second-class bureaucracy‖ can explain these liberal 
interludes; nor, for that matter, can they explain how quickly and 
dramatically these interludes came to an end. 
There is also, it must be said, reason to be leery of historical and 
cultural explanations in general. To explain individual behavior as the 
product of collective norms or collective history is to overlook both the 
importance of individual choice and the extent to which group behavior is 
itself the product of individual choice writ large.
85
 Japanese judges, in 
particular, are not unthinking automatons, or helpless pawns in a social or 
historical narrative that they are powerless to resist. They are, on the 
contrary, rational and sophisticated to a fault. Precisely because they are, 
like other highly intelligent human beings, capable of critically examining 
past practice and old ways of thinking, there have been many judges and 
even members of the SCJ who have been willing to adopt a more 
progressive stance. The question is why these intrepid souls have not 
prevailed. History and culture may suggest ways in which the deck has 
been stacked against them. But history is not destiny, and culture is as 
much a consequence as a cause of political behavior.  
 
 
 83. See Interview with Haruhiko Abe, supra note 40; Shigenori Matsui, The History of the 
Japanese Supreme Court 6–8 (June 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) 
(discussing the Court‘s decisions under the leadership of Chief Justice Mabuchi, including the Placard 
case). 
 84. See supra notes 15, 26 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra notes 28, 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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IV. POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS 
A. Political Constraints upon Judicial Review: External or Self-Imposed? 
No one of even modest sophistication and candor can deny that 
constitutional adjudication by the SCJ is, in some sense, political. It takes 
no deep understanding of the relationship between judicial politics and 
electoral politics to realize that a court that has coexisted for decades with 
a conservative ruling party is likely to behave at least somewhat 
conservatively. Even from a normative perspective, it is reasonable, if not 
healty, for a court to show a degree of respect for political processes and 
electoral outcomes when interpreting constitutional provisions written in 
highly abstract language that have potentially profound implications for 
national policy. The question, therefore, is not whether politics have 
constrained the exercise of judicial review in Japan, but in what ways. 
Specifically, there are two questions to be asked. First, to the extent 
that the constraint is imposed by other political actors, who imposes that 
constraint? Second, to the extent that the constraint is self-imposed, what 
are the reasons for which the Court restrains itself? The distinction 
between imposed and self-imposed political constraints is, admittedly, an 
artificial one. A court may choose to restrain itself only because it knows 
that it will otherwise be constrained by others. Indeed, from a political 
actor‘s perspective, there may be no better way to control a court than to 
induce the court to control itself: in this manner, control is achieved 
without a formal sacrifice of judicial independence. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is a useful device for structuring discussion of an otherwise 
unruly topic. 
With respect to the question of who constrains the Court, there are 
essentially two candidates—the government and the people themselves. 
Does the Court answer to the wishes of the government, to those of the 
people, or to some combination of the two? As Frank Upham has astutely 
observed of the long-running debate between Mark Ramseyer and Eric 
Rasmusen, on the one side, and John Haley, on the other, both sides 
actually agree that ―conservative political values‖ dominate Japanese 
judicial behavior.86 Where they disagree, instead, is on ―who the ultimate 
master is.‖87 In Haley‘s view, the judiciary shares the values of the general 
 
 
 86. Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese 
Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421, 447 (2005). 
 87. Id. at 446. 
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public
88
 and protects itself from the partisan whims of the government by 
maintaining the trust of the people,
89
 who in turn ―overwhelmingly favor 
center-right political policies.‖90 It is therefore the mood of the public that 
ultimately drives the conservatism of the courts. In Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen‘s view, by contrast, conservative politicians have for decades 
employed the potent instrument of judicial appointments to keep the SCJ 
in line.91 
One might object that this particular disagreement is academic, in the 
pejorative sense of the word, because the politicians are themselves 
elected by the people, with the result that obedience to one is obedience to 
the other. The problem, however, is that the two masters can and do 
conflict with one another: the actions of an elected government do not 
necessarily reflect the wishes of a popular majority. With respect to the 
meaning of the pacifist provisions found in Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution,
92
 for example, one Justice explained that the SCJ is very 
aware that it is caught between public opinion, on the one hand, and the 
views of the government and diplomatic pressure from a key ally, on the 
other hand.
93
 A substantial majority of the public currently opposes any 
amendment of Article 9.94 Dilution of Article 9 has, however, been a 
central plank of the LDP platform since the party‘s inception and has now 
become part of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)‘s platform as well, at 
the same time as the United States has pushed Japan to assume greater 
responsibility for its own security as well as that of the region.95 It is 
precisely because the SCJ is aware of the forces arrayed on both sides, this 
Justice suggested, that the Court has not merely hesitated to wade into the 
treacherous waters of Article 9, but has also barred the lower courts from 
doing so.96 In other words, the Court‘s response has been neither to 
 
 
 88. See Haley, supra note 6, at 1485. 
 89. See Haley, supra note 13, at 127–28; Upham, supra note 86, at 446. 
 90. See Haley, supra note 6, at 1471. 
 91. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in 
Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331, 333 (2001); Upham, supra note 86, at 446. 
 92. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (renouncing ―the threat or use of force as means 
of settling international disputes,‖ and stipulating, inter alia, that ―land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained.‖). 
 93. See Interview with Justice E, supra note 18. 
 94. See Editorial, The Constitution Today, ASAHI SHIMBUN & INT‘L HERALD TRIBUNE (Tokyo), 
May 5, 2008 (reporting the results of a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in which 66% of 
respondents expressed opposition to amending Article 9). 
 95. See BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 26, at 17–19, 21 (describing the history of the pro-
amendment faction of the LDP and the subsequent exertion of American pressure on Japan to rearm). 
 96. See Haley, supra note 26, at 24–27 (describing the SCJ‘s use of the political question 
doctrine to render cases involving Article 9 justiciable only in theory). 
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mediate between the two opposing forces or to chart a middle course 
between them, but instead to avoid taking a position altogether, with the 
net result that the government has enjoyed a free hand to pursue its 
preferred policies. The Court‘s actions also suggest that there may be 
merit to both sides of the debate, in the sense that the Court appears 
reluctant to defy either the public or the government. 
With respect to the second question, it is clear that the SCJ exercises a 
large measure of self-restraint in the area of judicial review, and especially 
so where politically sensitive issues are involved,
97
 but its reasons for 
doing so are much less clear. Does it restrain itself out of fear that 
antagonizing the public or the government will jeopardize its institutional 
autonomy? Is it afraid that the result of vigorous judicial review will be an 
embarrassing episode of noncompliance by the government? Or is its 
reluctance to strike down laws motivated by a sincere, normatively 
grounded respect for democratic processes? Unfortunately, as any social 
scientist will attest, motivation can be difficult to ascertain; it is not an 
empirical phenomenon that can be directly observed, and different 
motivations can often be inferred from the same behavior.  
Consider, for example, one Justice‘s observation that the Court views 
constitutional adjudication as ―political‖ in the sense that the Justices feel 
pressure to decide cases in ways that are consistent with ―national 
sentiment.‖98 That observation leaves open the question of why the Court 
responds to ―national sentiment.‖ Do they heed ―national sentiment‖ 
because they believe, as a normative or ideological matter, that it is the 
right thing to do? Do they fear that the interests of the Court or judiciary as 
an institution are threatened by defiance of public opinion? Or do they 
simply prefer to avoid the disapproval of their friends and neighbors? 
Simply to observe that the Court follows public opinion begs the crucial 
question of what its underlying motivation happens to be. 
Part IV.B explores the possibility of external constraint and, in 
particular, the argument that judicial review is rare because the 
government has used the power of appointment to subdue the Court. Part 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPŌ SOSHO [CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 429 (2d ed. 
2008) (observing that the SCJ tries not to get involved in ―politically sensitive cases,‖ such as those 
involving Article 9); Interview with Justice E, supra note 18 (indicating that the SCJ‘s avoidance of 
Article 9 cases reflects a ―political judgment,‖ and that Japanese judges are generally ―apolitical‖ but 
have little choice in light of national sentiment on certain constitutional issues but to make ―very 
political decisions‖ on constitutional issues); supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the 
controversy surrounding Article 9). 
 98. Interview with Justice E, supra note 18. 
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IV.C focuses on the question of self-restraint or, more specifically, 
whether the Court‘s self-restraint is principled or strategic in character. 
B. External Constraint: Government Influence Via the Appointments 
Process 
A straightforward political explanation of the SCJ‘s failure to strike 
down laws is simply that, for decades, conservative governments have 
appointed conservative Justices. In Japan, as elsewhere, one way in which 
a government can ensure that a court does not challenge its desired 
policies is by appointing ideologically like-minded judges. ―The reason 
Japanese Supreme Court justices uphold LDP positions,‖ Mark Ramseyer 
and Eric Rasmusen argue, ―is straightforward: For most of the postwar 
period they have been recent LDP appointees.‖99  
In response, John Haley has vigorously disputed the notion that the 
government plays any meaningful role in the selection of Justices, much 
less that it screens nominees on the basis of their ideological views.100 
Haley argues that the role of the Prime Minister in selecting Justices is, 
like that of the Emperor, a largely formal one,101 and that in practice, the 
Prime Minister simply gives pro forma approval to the recommendations 
given to him by the Chief Justice, who is in turn guided by a cadre of 
senior judges in the General Secretariat, the administrative arm of the 
Supreme Court, in identifying and vetting potential candidates. Haley 
emphasizes, in particular, that there is no known case in living memory of 
a Prime Minister rejecting a Chief Justice‘s recommendation as to who 
should fill a vacancy.102 As he depicts it, the Japanese judiciary is a 
bureaucracy that enjoys virtually complete autonomy from the government 
 
 
 99. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 91, at 331; see also J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. 
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 
126 (2003) (arguing that LDP leaders ―appointed only loyal LDP partisans to the Supreme Court‖); J. 
MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCIS MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN‘S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 178 (1993) 
(arguing that ―Japanese judges are agents of LDP principals‖). 
 100. See Haley, supra note 13, at 109 (lauding the ―absence of partisan or other political influence 
on Supreme Court appointments‖ in Japan); see also David M. O‘Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling 
Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE 
OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 37, 59 (Peter H. Russell & 
David M. O‘Brien eds., 2001) (―[J]udicial appointments are made largely on the recommendation of 
the chief justice and the General Secretariat. Lower court judges are more the agents of the chief 
justice and the General Secretariat than they are of the LDP or other political parties.‖). 
 101. As a formal matter, the KENPŌ provides that the Emperor appoints the Chief Justice ―as 
designated by the Cabinet,‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ, art. 6, para. 2, while the power to appoint the other 
members of the court is vested directly in the Cabinet, id. art. 79, para. 1.  
 102. See Haley, supra note 13, at 106–07. 
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and is trusted to manage its own affairs under the direction of a cadre of 
―cautious and conservative‖ senior judges.103 
The SCJ is indeed part of a conservative bureaucracy,
104
 but it is by no 
means immune from political manipulation via the appointments process. 
There are several mechanisms by which the government shapes the 
composition of the Court. One, but only one, of these mechanisms is the 
Prime Minister‘s power to reject the Chief Justice‘s recommendations, 
which casts a long shadow over the selection process regardless of 
whether it is actually exercised. Unless the Chief Justice relishes the 
thought of having his recommendations publicly rejected by the Prime 
Minister, or even jeopardizing his informal power of recommendation 
altogether, he will take care not to suggest ideologically unacceptable 
candidates in the first place.105 Knowing this, the Prime Minister can 
therefore ―safely rubber-stamp‖ the Chief Justice‘s nominees.106 It 
becomes especially unnecessary for the government to scrutinize the 
judiciary‘s chosen candidates, moreover, if the leadership of the judiciary 
already shares the government‘s ideology. Once an ideologically reliable 
leadership is in place, the judiciary‘s rigorous internal controls can be 
relied upon to ensure ideological consistency over time without the need 
for overt government intervention.
107
  
In practice, however, the threat that the Prime Minister may exercise 
his veto power is rendered moot by the fact that the government has the 
opportunity to reject candidates long before the Chief Justice submits their 
names to the Prime Minister for approval. Indeed, in some cases, the 
government, not the judiciary, is responsible for the initial selection of 
candidates. This responsibility is in accordance with the longstanding 
practice of allocating seats on the Court to different constituencies.
108
 The 
 
 
 103. Id. at 125; see id. at 114 (opining that Japanese judges ―enjoy a greater degree of 
independence from political intrusion than in any other industrial democracy, both with respect to 
individual cases as well as the composition of the judiciary‖); id. at 126 (dubbing the Japanese 
judiciary an ―autonomously governed bureaucracy for which there are few if any parallels in the 
world‖). 
 104. See Interview with Justice E, supra note 18 (observing ruefully that the SCJ is ―just another 
bureaucratic organization‖). 
 105. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 99, at 63 (arguing that the judges responsible for 
selecting supreme court nominees have in practice ―only nominated people they knew the prime 
minister would approve‖). 
 106. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 91, at 333. 
 107. See Law, supra note 60, at 804–05 (arguing that the Japanese judiciary is characterized by 
―policy stability,‖ or consistency and predictability over time, ―thanks to a combination of lifelong 
processes of screening and professionalization and fearsome internal disciplinary mechanisms”). 
 108. See Law, supra note 1, at 1564–72 (describing the current allocation of seats); Repeta, supra 
note 15, at 1716–39  (describing the evolution and manipulation of the SCJ‘s ―reserved seats‖ system). 
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Chief Justice and General Secretariat select candidates to fill the six seats 
on the Court that are allocated to the career judiciary, as well as a seventh 
seat that is typically held by a legal academic,
109
 but they are not involved 
in the initial selection of candidates for the remaining eight seats. Instead, 
two of these seats are ordinarily filled by the Ministry of Justice,
110
 while 
two more are filled by the Cabinet itself.
111
 
Last but not least, the heavy reliance of the selection process upon 
behind-the-scenes consultation and consensus building—a typically 
Japanese style of decision making known as nemawashi
112—ensures in a 
subtle but effective way that the Chief Justice nominates only candidates 
who are palatable to the government.113 As a Justice with experience in 
personnel matters revealed, the Chief Justice‘s recommendations to the 
Prime Minister  
are merely the last stage of a process in which potential nominees 
have already been vetted by the Prime Minister‘s office before the 
Chief Justice makes his recommendations. . . . [T]he Cabinet 
Secretary, or Kanbōchōkan, engages in ―negotiations‖ over 
potential candidates with the Secretary General, or Jimusocho, who 
is appointed by and works closely with the Chief Justice. . . . Only 
after these key aides to the Prime Minister and Chief Justice have 
already arrived at a mutually satisfactory conclusion does the Chief 
Justice convey his (pre-approved) recommendations to the Prime 
Minister.114 
Thus, it is simply wrong to infer from the Prime Minister‘s routine 
acceptance of the Chief Justice‘s recommendations that the appointment of 
Supreme Court Justices is free of political control. The Prime Minister‘s 
power to reject candidates who have already been vetted by his office is 
 
 
 109. See Law, supra note 1, at 1556–64, 1572–74. 
 110. See id. at 1565. 
 111. See id. at 1571–72; infra Part V.A (describing the Cabinet Legislation Bureau). Japan‘s bar 
associations nominate private attorneys to fill the four remaining seats. See Law, supra note 1, at 
1566–69; Repeta, supra note 15, at 1737–39. 
 112. See Seki, infra note 130, at 185–86 (describing the Cabinet Legislation Bureau‘s use of 
nemawashi to vet proposed legislation). 
 113. See Law, supra note 1, at 1550–51. 
 114. Id. at 1550–51. A Justice with experience in the General Secretariat elaborated that, prior to 
the negotiations between the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretary General, substantive discussions take 
place between the assistant to the Cabinet Secretary and the Director of the General Secretariat‘s 
Personnel Division—all of which, in turn, is a prelude to the Chief Justice‘s ritual presentation of a 
final, preapproved list of names to the Prime Minister. See id. at 1551; Interview with Justice G, supra 
note 62. 
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never exercised because it is completely redundant—not to mention more 
conspicuous and embarrassing than discreet negotiation.  
C. Self-Restraint: Normative or Strategic? 
A number of Justices with whom I spoke attributed the extreme rarity 
of judicial review to a normative obligation on the part of the judiciary to 
defer to the wishes of the Cabinet and Diet. This type of argument is 
certainly familiar to American readers from the endlessly rehashed debate 
over the so-called ―counter-majoritarian dilemma‖ of judicial review.115 
The theoretical basis of such arguments is not nearly as strong with respect 
to the SCJ, however, as it is with respect to the United States Supreme 
Court. It is often argued that American federal judges should defer to the 
elected branches because they are unelected and lack democratic 
legitimacy. By contrast, Japanese Supreme Court Justices are 
constitutionally required to face retention elections after their initial 
appointment and at ten-year intervals thereafter,116 and the Court, in turn, 
enjoys a remarkable degree of control over the rest of the judiciary. Thus, 
at least in theory, the members of the SCJ enjoy a degree of direct 
electoral legitimacy that their American counterparts do not, even if the 
retention elections have little effect in practice.117  
The argument that respect for democracy leads the SCJ to abstain from 
striking down laws is perhaps only to be expected, as it casts the timid 
Japanese approach to judicial review in a highly principled light. But it is 
also a fact that the SCJ has powerful practical and strategic reasons to 
refrain from challenging the government. As Takao Tanase aptly puts it, 
the proposition that judges must defer to the government may be a 
―normative statement,‖ but it also happens to be ―inseparably linked with 
 
 
 115. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–22 (2d ed. 1986); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial 
Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 727–30 (2009) (noting the centrality of the countermajoritarian dilemma to 
contemporary constitutional theory, and describing the growing scholarly attacks upon the empirical 
premise that judicial review is countermajoritarian). 
 116. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 2 (―The appointment of the 
judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members 
of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first 
general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the 
same manner thereafter.‖). As a practical matter, however, the retention elections that are supposed to 
be held at ten-year intervals are rendered moot by the fact that most justices are first appointed at an 
age well within ten years of mandatory retirement. See O‘Brien & Ohkoshi, supra note 100, at 53–54. 
 117. See Tokuji Izumi, Concerning the Japanese Public’s Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1769 (2011) (questioning the value and efficacy of the retention elections in light 
of how little the public knows about the Court).  
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their strategic options.‖118 Like every court, the SCJ must contend with the 
fact that it lacks the power of either the purse or the sword, which limits its 
strategic options.
119
 Yet Japanese courts possess even fewer means of 
coercion and are thus in an even more precarious position than their 
American counterparts: they lack contempt powers, have relatively little 
ability to order discovery or compel disclosure, and do not exercise the 
kind of continuing jurisdiction over parties that would enable them to 
ensure long-term compliance with their rulings.120  
Not only is the SCJ mindful that it has no obvious way of imposing its 
will upon the Cabinet or the Diet, but its impotence has also been on 
display for some time. When the Court struck down a statutory provision 
punishing parricide more severely than other forms of homicide, the 
conservative Diet registered its unhappiness by refusing for decades either 
to respond to the decision or to amend the law.121 The Court has insisted 
for decades that electoral malapportionment has reached unconstitutional 
levels, yet the LDP has yet to introduce an apportionment scheme that 
satisfies the standards set forth by the Court.122 When asked what means 
the SCJ possesses of forcing or even encouraging legislators and 
bureaucrats to comply with its decisions, one Justice responded simply: 
―We don‘t have any.‖123 Another Justice likened the Court‘s power of 
judicial review to a denka no hōtō, or revered ceremonial sword: one 
leaves the sword on the mantle and refrains from actually using it for fear 
of revealing to the world that the sword is in fact dull, thus destroying 
whatever value the sword may have had in the first place.124 Not all 
insiders agree, however, that the SCJ restrains itself for fear of 
highlighting its impotence. One Justice observed that, although the SCJ is 
sometimes ―disappointed‖ by Diet inaction in response to its rulings, its 
 
 
 118. Interview with Takao Tanase, supra note 17. 
 119. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (―The 
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or 
of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have 
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.‖). 
 120. See Haley, supra note 6, at 1484 (contrasting the ability of common law judges to ―exercise 
continuing jurisdiction to ensure compliance with their decrees‖ and ―coercive powers through 
contempt‖ with the more circumscribed authority of European and Japanese judges); Matsui, supra 
note 1, at 1413–16 (noting specifically the Japanese judiciary‘s lack of contempt powers); Interview 
with Matt Wilson, Professor, Temple Univ., in Tokyo, Japan (June 20, 2008) (highlighting the limited 
discovery powers of Japanese courts). 
 121. See ITOH, supra note 14, at 148–49; supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 123. Interview with Justice D, supra note 35. 
 124. Interview with Justice E, supra note 18. 
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conservatism ultimately has much more to do with the composition of the 
Court itself than any strategic calculations regarding the likely reactions of 
the other branches.125 
To the extent that judicial self-restraint is responsible for choking off 
judicial review, there is reason to suspect that the strategic variety is more 
to blame than the principled variety. A telltale sign is the inconsistency in 
the judiciary‘s approach to different types of cases that Frank Upham 
highlights in his contribution to this Symposium.126 On the one hand, 
argues Upham, Japanese courts have played an ―activist role‖ by boldly 
misusing the general clauses of the Civil Code to regulate private 
employers and rewrite the law of divorce in ways that were more 
protective of women and workers than the government might have liked.127 
This ―lack of deference to the legislative branch‖ is difficult to reconcile 
with the notion that Japanese judges refrain from striking down laws out 
of principled respect for democratic lawmaking processes.128 On the other 
hand, as Professor Upham acknowledges, the courts clearly cannot be 
accused of ―judicial activism‖ when it comes to exercising the power of 
judicial review.129 If one accepts that the judiciary acts strategically out of 
self-preservation, however, there is no mystery at all to this inconsistency. 
It is less confrontational, and thus less hazardous for the judiciary as an 
institution, to regulate private conduct in ways that the government can 
override, than to impose limits on the government‘s power to make policy. 
Adopting policies that target faceless corporations and philandering 
 
 
 125. Interview with Justice B, supra note 48. 
 126. See Frank K. Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by Japanese Courts, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1493 (2011). 
 127. Id. at 1493–94; see id. at 1499–1500 (discussing the SCJ‘s cavalier approach to the language 
of the Labor Standards Act in the Sumitomo Cement line of cases); id. at 1502 (observing that the 
general clauses were intended only to enable courts ―to reach justice in cases when the strict 
application of the legal rules will lead to a result inconsistent with the purpose of the [statute]‖ and 
were not intended ―to give the courts the power to supplant, even temporarily, the legislature as the 
institution responsible for establishing fundamental norms‖).  
 128. Id. at 1498. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Japanese courts evince a form of respect for 
democratic processes that American courts do not. On Upham‘s view, the greater willingness of 
Japanese courts to ―change norms openly‖ is balanced—perhaps favorably—by their greater 
―willingness to allow the political process to operate after judicial announcement of the law.‖ Id. at 
1504. To put his argument in colloquial terms, the American brand of judicial activism allows the 
legislature to have the first word but not the last word, whereas the Japanese brand gives the legislature 
the last word but not necessarily the first word. Although Upham himself does not say so, the Japanese 
version of judicial activism might be said to evince greater respect for democratic lawmaking by 
giving the legislature an opportunity to ratify or reject the judiciary‘s approach, then leaving the 
judiciary‘s response undisturbed.  
 129. Id. at 1494.  
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husbands, for the benefit of a majority of the public, is one thing; 
attempting to tie the hands of the Japanese state is another thing entirely. 
V. INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
A. Pre-Enactment Review by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
Another possible explanation for the failure of judicial review in Japan 
is that some institution other than the judiciary has taken responsibility for 
evaluating the constitutionality of government action. Some observers 
have pointed in particular to the existence of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau (CLB), or Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku, as an important reason for why 
the SCJ has so rarely struck down legislation. Modeled after France‘s elite 
Conseil d’État, the CLB has responsibility for drafting and reviewing 
prospective Cabinet legislation.130 By all accounts a prestigious and 
influential institution, its eighty or so members are elite senior bureaucrats 
on temporary assignment from other agencies; most possess significant 
expertise in legal matters.
131
 At any given time, approximately ten percent 
of CLB personnel are judges and lawyers.
132
 Former CLB officials, in 
turn, are often appointed to the SCJ, including many who themselves had 
never been judges. Assignment to the CLB, for what is typically a 
three-year term, is strongly indicative of an elite career trajectory that can 
culminate in appointment to the SCJ, even for those with no prior judicial 
experience.133  
Some scholars and judges argue that the CLB reviews government 
legislation so carefully and expertly prior to enactment that the SCJ is 
highly unlikely to find constitutional flaws in the final product.134 The fact 
that many current and former CLB members are themselves judges, 
moreover, can only enhance the CLB‘s ability to anticipate what the courts 
will find acceptable. Indeed, given the nature of the ties between the CLB 
 
 
 130. See SHINICHI NISHIKAWA, RIPPO NO CHUSU SHIRAREIZADU KANCHO: NAIKOKU HŌSEIKYU 
[THE MYSTERIOUS CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU] (2000); Yasuo Hasebe, The Supreme Court of 
Japan: Its Adjudication on Electoral Systems and Economic Freedoms, 5 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 296, 298–
99 (2007); Mamoru Seki, The Drafting Process for Cabinet Bills, 19 L. IN JAPAN 168 (Daniel H. Foote 
trans., 1986); Richard J. Samuels, Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: 
Who Elected These Guys, Anyway? (Japan Policy Research Inst. Working Paper No. 99, 2004), 
available at http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html.  
 131. See NISHIKAWA, supra note 130. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. A former CLB official who is not also a career judge will usually assume one of the 
two seats on the SCJ that are informally allocated to former prosecutors, as discussed below. 
 134. See, e.g., id.; Hideo Chikusa, Japanese Supreme Court—Its Institution and Background, 52 
SMU L. REV. 1719, 1725–26 (1999); Hasebe, supra note 130, at 298. 
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and the judiciary, members of the SCJ have no doubt found themselves on 
occasion in the position of deciding upon the constitutionality of 
legislation that they had previously reviewed and approved as members of 
the CLB.  
It is unduly optimistic to think that pre-enactment review by the CLB 
has been so thorough and effective that the SCJ is left with practically 
nothing to do. Comparison of the CLB and the French Conseil d’État is 
instructive. No less than its Japanese equivalent, the Conseil d'État is a 
highly elite, capable, and well-respected institution that performs pre-
enactment review and gives influential advice on the constitutionality of 
legislation.135 Notwithstanding the longtime presence and formidable 
reputation of the Conseil d’État, however, France‘s Conseil 
Constitutionnel has struck down much more important laws, and with 
much greater frequency, than the SCJ has done over a longer span of 
time.136 There is no reason to believe that the CLB is vastly more skilled at 
screening proposed legislation for constitutional defects than the Conseil 
d’État. 
It is also doubtful whether the CLB‘s views carry much weight, if any, 
with the SCJ. Given that the CLB reviews approximately eighty percent of 
all legislation before it is enacted,137 it is certainly possible that preventive 
work by the CLB may play a role in reducing the number of ―bad laws‖ 
that are enacted. What the CLB does not appear to enjoy, however, is 
judicial deference. One Justice deemed it ―too extreme‖ to suggest that the 
SCJ hesitates to strike down laws simply because they have been reviewed 
by the CLB;138 another Justice stated more bluntly that the CLB‘s views 
carry ―no influence‖ with the Court.139 Likewise, the Court‘s influential 
chōsakan, or law clerks, appear to pay the CLB little heed: those whom I 
interviewed consistently took the position that they and their fellow clerks 
 
 
 135. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 14–24 (5th ed. 
1998).  
 136. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, the rate at which it has invalidated legislation, and the importance of the legislation 
that it has invalidated). An example of Conseil Constitutionnel jurisprudence that the SCJ has never 
rivaled in terms of policy impact was the invalidation in 1981 of Socialist President François 
Miterrand‘s centerpiece economic policy of nationalizing the industrial and financial sectors. See 
STONE, supra note 68, at 158–62. 
 137. See Interview with Shinichi Nishikawa, supra note 13. The CLB is not responsible for 
reviewing bills introduced by individual members of the Diet, or so-called private member‘s bills. 
 138. Interview with Justice B, supra note 48. 
 139. Interview with Justice C, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan (Date Concealed). 
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place little or no weight upon what the CLB or, indeed, any other 
government agency has to say.  
Nevertheless, even if the notion that judicial review can be rendered 
largely superfluous by expert bureaucrats who prevent unconstitutional 
laws from being enacted warrants a degree of skepticism, the CLB is 
undoubtedly an important part of the political ecosystem within which the 
SCJ operates and is likely relevant to a complete understanding of the 
SCJ‘s behavior. In particular, there is reason to think that CLB has enabled 
the SCJ to avoid potential difficulties surrounding the interpretation and 
enforcement of Article 9 by bearing the brunt of political conflict that 
might otherwise have befallen the SCJ. The CLB has in recent years come 
under pressure from the LDP for its efforts to adhere to an interpretation of 
Article 9 that leaves the government less leeway than it might like.140 The 
fact that the CLB has staked out a position on Article 9 and, in doing so, 
served as a lightning rod for past efforts to expand Japan‘s military 
capabilities, has perhaps alleviated potential pressure on the SCJ to 
confront the issue itself.  
B. The Influence of Personnel Exchanges Between the Judiciary and the 
Ministry of Justice 
Yet another explanation for the failure of judicial review concerns the 
close relationship between Japanese judges and prosecutors. Even more so 
than the CLB, the Ministry of Justice regularly exchanges personnel with 
the judiciary. Under the practice known as hanken-kōryu, approximately 
twenty percent of Japanese judges work at the Hōmushō in some capacity 
during their careers.141 Participation in the hanken-kōryu bodes well for a 
judge‘s future career prospects upon returning to the judiciary.142 
Prosecutors on loan to the judiciary, meanwhile, can expect favorable 
treatment in the form of assignment to major courts in desirable 
locations.143 Prosecutors also enjoy the benefit of an informal quota of 
seats on the SCJ: there are usually two of them on the Court at any given 
time,144 a figure that does not include career judges who have prosecutorial 
experience on account of having spent time in the Ministry of Justice. 
 
 
 140. See Samuels, supra note 130; see also NISHIKAWA, supra note 130 (noting that the CLB has 
encountered difficulty ―managing‖ its interpretation of Article 9 in the face of political pressure). 
 141. See Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 50–51. 
 142. See id. at 50. 
 143. See id. 
 144. ―Prosecutor‖ is what lawyers in the Ministry of Justice are typically called in English, but it 
is perhaps a poor translation of the corresponding Japanese term, kenji or shomu-kenji. In practice, 
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There are two reasons why the Court‘s ties to the Ministry of Justice 
might help to foster an extremely conservative approach to judicial review. 
The first has to do with the fact that the Ministry of Justice has 
responsibility for drafting both the Civil Code and the Criminal Code, 
which amount to a significant portion of the statutory law that the courts 
are called upon to interpret and apply. It would not be surprising if judges 
were to exhibit a tendency to uphold legislation drafted by their former 
colleagues at the Ministry of Justice—or perhaps, indeed, by the judges 
themselves during their temporary tenure as government attorneys.145 The 
second reason is that prosecutorial experience may have the effect of 
making judges more conservative and sympathetic to the government. The 
practice of loaning judges to the Hōmushō has been criticized on the 
ground that the judges in question acquire ―pro-government attitudes‖ that 
influence their behavior upon their return to the bench.146 
Even if it is true that prosecutorial experience makes judges more 
conservative, however, it is unclear that the judiciary‘s close relationship 
with the Ministry of Justice does much to explain the conservatism of the 
SCJ in particular. To be sure, the prosecutors who have served on the SCJ 
have enjoyed a reputation for conservatism, but the fact remains that they 
make up only a small fraction of the Court‘s membership. Of the SCJ‘s 
current fifteen members, only two are former prosecutors, and only one of 
the six career judges currently on the Court appears to have spent any time 
at the Ministry of Justice.147 
C. The Bureaucratic Structure and Internal Discipline of the Judiciary 
A number of scholars have voiced a simple yet powerful explanation 
for the conservatism of Japan‘s lower court judges: the judiciary is a 
tightly controlled bureaucracy, the judges at the top are conservative, and 
these top bureaucrats favor like-minded conservatives while consigning 
 
 
Japanese prosecutors might be better described as general-purpose government attorneys. Like lawyers 
in the U.S. Department of Justice, they represent the government in all public litigation matters; unlike 
their American counterparts, however, they also do a significant amount of legislative drafting.  
 145. See Hasebe, supra note 130, at 298–300. 
 146. Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 51. This type of outlook, in turn, appears to be valued and 
rewarded by the judicial bureaucracy: as Setsuo Miyazawa observes, there is reason to suspect that the 
General Secretariat has deliberately assigned judges with prosecutorial experience to handle sensitive 
cases that it wishes to have decided in favor of the government. See id. at 51–52. 
 147. See Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
english/justices/index.html (last visited May 13, 2011). As of this writing, the most recent appointee is 
Itsuro Terada, who also happens to be the only career judge on the SCJ with experience at the Ministry 
of Justice. See id. 
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those who are liberal or otherwise heterodox to professional oblivion.148 
Professors Ramseyer and Rasmusen, in particular, have amassed statistical 
evidence that career judges who belong to a left-of-center political group 
or rule against the government on politically sensitive constitutional 
questions suffer systematically over the course of their careers: even if one 
controls for such factors as educational background and productivity, such 
judges are likely to spend more time at less prestigious courts in less 
desirable locations and to advance up the pay scale more slowly.149  
The argument that lower court judges are at the mercy of a 
conservative bureaucracy is a highly plausible explanation for their 
reluctance to wield the power of judicial review against a conservative 
government. But it does little to explain why the Supreme Court fails to 
exercise that power either.150 The logic of reward and punishment that 
applies so forcefully to other Japanese judges simply does not apply to 
Supreme Court Justices. Having already reached the pinnacle of the 
judiciary, the Justices of the SCJ are immune to the prospect of promotion 
or punishment by the General Secretariat; indeed, at least in theory, they 
are responsible for supervising and directing the General Secretariat. The 
only career goal that a sitting Justice might conceivably have left to pursue 
is elevation to the position of Chief Justice.151 That incentive, in turn, is 
unlikely to exert much influence over any meaningful number of Justices 
for any meaningful period of time. In practice, only those who have been 
career judges are considered for appointment to the position of Chief 
Justice,
152
 and of the five or so justices who meet that requirement at any 
given time, some will already be too close to mandatory retirement age to 
be considered viable candidates.
153
  
 
 
 148. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 99, at 17–25; Law, supra note 1, at 1551–64 
(describing judicial hiring and promotion practices in Japan); Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 57–59; 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 99, at 333–34; Upham, supra note 86, at 453 (opining that ―even 
readers more familiar with the bureaucratic judiciaries of the civil law world will be surprised by the 
personnel manipulation and unrelenting supervision of the Japanese judicial system‖). 
 149. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 99, at 26–43; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 
99, at 338–41. 
 150. See O‘Brien & Ohkoshi, supra note 100, at 39 (faulting Ramseyer and his coauthors for 
―focus[ing] only on the lower courts and, rather oddly, pay[ing] no attention to the operation of the 
Supreme Court‖). 
 151. See Law, supra note 1, at 1550–51, 1589–92 (describing the unique administrative powers 
that render the Chief Justice more than merely ―first among equals‖). 
 152. See id. at 1522–23 n.25. The current Chief Justice, Hironobu Takesaki, is a rare exception to 
the general rule that Chief Justices are selected from among sitting members of the Court. See id. at 
1569 n.148. 
 153. The career judges who are appointed to the Court serve an average of approximately seven 
years before reaching mandatory retirement age. See Law, supra note 1, at 1575. In recent decades, the 
Chief Justice has almost invariably been a career judge who is elevated to the position after having 
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In order to account for the SCJ‘s behavior, Ramseyer and Rasmusen 
emphasize instead the LDP‘s ultimate control over the appointment of 
Supreme Court Justices. They argue that the SCJ is conservative for the 
―straightforward‖ reason that ―almost all the justices have been recent 
LDP appointees.‖154 A mildly puzzling aspect of this account, however, is 
that it depicts the conservative tendencies of the SCJ and the conservative 
tendencies of the lower courts as essentially separate phenomena that call 
for different explanations155 when, in fact, the two phenomena are deeply 
intertwined. Ramseyer and Rasmusen‘s own statistical evidence suggests, 
for example, that conservative judges are more likely to receive influential 
administrative postings in the General Secretariat.
156
 They further observe 
that this same cadre of judges in the General Secretariat is also largely 
responsible for vetting and nominating Supreme Court candidates. It is 
safe to assume that conservative judges are inclined to place fellow 
conservatives throughout the upper reaches of the judiciary, including the 
SCJ: to advance the career of a fellow judge who shares one‘s own policy 
preferences is to advance one‘s own policy preferences. Thus, the fact that 
the judges who select SCJ candidates are themselves conservative should 
tend to ensure that the SCJ will also be conservative. Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen do not draw this connection explicitly, however, but instead 
attribute the conservatism of the SCJ to the long shadow cast by the Prime 
Minister‘s rarely exercised power to veto ideologically unpalatable 
nominees.  
Other scholars have, by contrast, emphasized how institutional factors 
link the ideological tendencies of the SCJ with those of the judicial 
bureaucracy: the bureaucracy, they observe, favors the career advancement 
 
 
already served on the Court for two or three years, which places him even closer to mandatory 
retirement than the average justice. See id. at 1522–23 & n.25. The current Chief Justice, Hironobu 
Takesaki, was appointed to the position at the unusually young age of sixty-four, which will allow him 
to serve for nearly six years before he faces mandatory retirement. See Justices of the Supreme Court: 
Takesaki, Hironobu, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/justices/takesaki. 
html (last visited May 30, 2011). More typical was Takesaki‘s immediate predecessor, Niro Shimada, 
who was promoted to Chief Justice shortly before his sixty-eighth birthday and consequently served in 
that position for barely two years before reaching mandatory retirement age. Likewise, Shimada‘s own 
predecessor, Akira Machida, faced mandatory retirement within four years of his promotion to Chief 
Justice. 
 154. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 99, at 63. 
 155. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 99, at 63 (opining that ―[t]he real puzzle is not the 
Supreme Court‘s conservatism but that of the lower courts,‖ as if to suggest that the two phenomena 
are distinct). 
 156. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 99, at 339 (finding statistically that judges who found 
constitutional violations in Article 9 or electoral malapportionment cases received fewer assignments 
to the General Secretariat). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1460 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1425 
 
 
 
 
of conservative judges who find themselves, as a result, in a position to 
promote the selection of like-minded Supreme Court nominees.157 My own 
view, which is broadly consistent with that of Professors Miyazawa, 
O‘Brien, and others, is that the behavior of the Supreme Court is the 
product of interaction between the internal organization of the judiciary 
and the political environment in which the Court operates.158 The 
composition of the Court and the resources and incentives surrounding its 
members are shaped both directly and indirectly by an institutional 
structure that equips a cadre of judges in administrative positions with a 
highly effective array of tools for securing conformity and suppressing 
deviance. The influence of the General Secretariat, nominally an arm of 
the Supreme Court, extends to the Supreme Court as well: not only is it 
responsible for grooming and selecting career judges to fill six of the 
fifteen seats on the Court,
159
 but it also exercises complete control over the 
chōsakan upon whom the Court must rely heavily in order to cope with an 
overwhelming and largely mandatory docket of over ten thousand cases 
per year.160 In other words, the Supreme Court commands the General 
Secretariat, but the General Secretariat pulls the strings.  
This centralization of power over both administrative and personnel 
matters in the General Secretariat, under the leadership of the Chief 
Justice, has important implications for the ability of a newly elected 
government to alter the ideological direction of the Court. It suggests, in 
particular, that in order to make the Court more liberal, the current DPJ 
government might need to do little more than replace the existing Chief 
 
 
 157. See, e.g., Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 59 (arguing that administrators in the General 
Secretariat share ―the perspective of the dominant political group in the legislative and administrative 
branches,‖ ―appoint like-minded judges to the [General Secretariat] and other key positions to control 
other judges,‖ and ―promote[] each other to higher positions‖); O‘Brien & Ohkoshi, supra note 100, at 
44–48 (arguing that the Chief Justice and General Secretariat exercise their considerable power over 
personnel matters and appointments to the Court in a manner that disadvantages judges who are ―too 
independent or too liberal‖). 
 158. See Law, supra note 1, at 1587; Miyazawa, supra note 15, at 59; O‘Brien & Ohkoshi, supra 
note 100, at 59 (―[T]he politics of the judicial bureaucracy, electoral outcomes, and the governmental 
infrastructure matter a great deal more for establishing judicial independence—both institutional 
independence and judicial independence on the bench—and for the exercise of constitutional review 
than the parchment guarantees of Japan's 1947 Constitution.‖). 
 159. See Law, supra note 1, at 1557–64 (describing the General Secretariat‘s control over the 
judicial career path to a seat on the Court). Moreover, the General Secretariat‘s influence over the 
composition of the SCJ has only grown over time, thanks to the allocation of an increased number of 
seats to the career judiciary at the expense of the private bar. See Repeta, supra note 15, at 1735–39 
(suggesting that this reallocation of seats had the effect, if not also the intent, of steering the Court to 
the right); Interview with Justice B, supra note 48 (indicating that the reallocation of seats was in fact 
intended to consolidate conservative control over the Court). 
 160. See Law, supra note 1, at 1577.  
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Justice and wait a few years. The fact that the Chief Justice is typically 
appointed to that position when he is already in his mid to late sixties and 
is subject to a mandatory retirement age of seventy normally ensures that 
the government will have the chance to replace this key figure within the 
space of four to five years, at most.
161
 Conversely, however, if the DPJ is 
for some reason unable to replace the Chief Justice, its ability to influence 
the Court, via the appointments mechanism or otherwise, would 
presumably be blunted.  
The problem for the DPJ is that the LDP appears to have anticipated 
these possibilities. It is a time-honored strategy for a government that 
anticipates electoral defeat to seek to entrench itself by appointing friendly 
judges who cannot easily be removed by the incoming government.162 In 
Japan, given the unusual degree of power concentrated in the hands of the 
Chief Justice, a highly effective way to pursue a judicial entrenchment 
strategy of this type is to appoint an ideologically reliable Chief Justice 
who is young enough to outlast the opposition‘s turn in power. It may be 
no coincidence that, in the face of imminent and resounding electoral 
defeat, the outgoing LDP government appointed Hironobu Takesaki to the 
position of Chief Justice at an uncharacteristically young age.
163
 The 
average length of time that Justices serve before reaching retirement age is 
only five-and-a-half years,
164
 and because the Chief Justice in particular is 
nearly always selected from among the former career judges who are 
already on the Court, he is unlikely to serve for more than two to four 
 
 
 161. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22–30 (2003) (offering the ―political insurance‖ thesis that governments 
facing a future loss of power can and do insure themselves against that prospect by empowering and 
staffing judicial institutions capable of thwarting and resisting the wishes of a future, hostile 
government); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–16 (2004) (offering the ―hegemonic preservation thesis‖ that ruling 
elites faced with an imminent loss of power seek to preserve their own hegemony by empowering 
judicial institutions that will share their outlook); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY 
OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 418–20 (2009) (describing how the Federalists reacted to the 
massive electoral rout of 1800 by creating new judicial positions and appointing a large number of so-
called ―midnight judges‖); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 91, at 333 (noting that it is optimal 
strategy for the party in power to appoint Justices close to retirement age in order to minimize the 
problem of ideological drift by sitting Justices, but the calculus shifts in favor of selecting younger 
Justices, who may be less predictable over the long run but will also remain in office longer, if the 
ruling party anticipates that it will soon be out of office). 
 163. At the time that the LDP broke with convention to select Hironobu Takesaki as Chief Justice 
in 2008, it was already clear that the party was heading for catastrophic electoral defeat on a scale that 
it had never before experienced in over fifty years of nearly uninterrupted rule. See Japan’s Crashing 
Economy: Cold Medicine, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2009, at 44 (reporting that, with a general election 
imminent, the LDP government enjoyed approval ratings of less than 10%). 
 164. See Law, supra note 1, at 1574. 
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years before facing mandatory retirement.165 At the time of his 
appointment, however, Takesaki had not previously served as an associate 
Justice and was nearly six years from mandatory retirement age.166 
Assuming that Takesaki exercises the degree of influence over 
appointments that Chief Justices are generally thought to enjoy, the result 
of Takesaki‘s appointment may be to blunt any efforts that the current 
government might make to modify the composition and behavior of the 
Court, at least in the short to medium term. 
VI. CONCLUSION: BREAKING THE GRIP OF THE BUREAUCRACY 
The fact that the Supreme Court of Japan has approached judicial 
review so conservatively for so long is ultimately unsurprising. Unless one 
believes that courts can be hermetically sealed from their political 
environment, it is unrealistic to think that the decades-long dominance of 
Japanese politics by the right-of-center LDP would not profoundly shape 
the behavior of the SCJ. Moreover, even though the government has, for 
the time being, taken a very slight turn to the left, it is unclear how quickly 
the judiciary will follow its lead. In the long run, the Court is bound to 
succumb eventually to the effects of an enduring political shift to the left. 
In the short term, however, the tendency of the judiciary to cling to its old 
ways should not be underestimated. As previously noted, a temporary but 
nonetheless serious obstacle to any immediate effort to reshape the Court 
is the fact that, on its way out of office, the LDP happened to stumble 
upon the simple but effective entrenchment strategy of appointing a Chief 
Justice who is young enough to potentially outlast the opposition‘s time in 
office.167 
A more enduring, structural reason why the SCJ seems unlikely to 
develop a sudden mania for judicial review, however, is its heavy 
dependence upon a hierarchical bureaucracy for both personnel and 
resources. As a bureaucratic organization, the Japanese judiciary is ill 
suited not simply by temperament, but by design, to challenge the 
government on matters of policy. Form and function, as Mirjan Damaška 
observes, are symbiotic: the fact that a judiciary is organized in a 
particular way renders it better suited to performing certain functions than 
 
 
 165. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text (discussing the political circumstances 
surrounding the appointment of Hironobu Takesaki as Chief Justice and the ways in which Takesaki 
was an atypical candidate). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] WHY HAS JUDICIAL REVIEW FAILED IN JAPAN? 1463 
 
 
 
 
others.168 The Japanese judiciary, in particular, is what Damaška would 
call a ―hierarchically‖ organized judiciary that is more suited to 
―policy-implementing‖ than to ―conflict-solving.‖169 The fact that 
tremendous power is concentrated in the hands of its leadership, in the 
form of an abundance of internal mechanisms for securing conformity and 
punishing deviance, renders the judiciary a stable and predictable 
mechanism for the transmission and implementation of government 
policy.  
What an organization with such characteristics cannot be expected to 
cultivate or even tolerate, by contrast, is a penchant for defying authority 
or exercising independent judgment on matters of policy. Yet it is 
precisely these qualities that a court must possess if it is to discharge the 
responsibility of judicial review. An organizational form that inculcates 
conformity to the wishes of judicial bureaucrats who epitomize 
conventional thinking is simply not conducive to judicial review, which 
entails scrutinizing and overturning rather than implementing the wishes 
of those in power. 
The fact that the Supreme Court is nominally in charge of the 
bureaucracy does not mean that it is independent of the bureaucracy. 
Instead, to a substantial degree, it is the bureaucracy that literally makes 
the Court. To turn the Japanese judiciary into something other than a 
policy-implementing arm of the state—one characterized by consistency, 
discipline, and fidelity to the sensibilities of those who wield power—will 
require more radical surgery than the American constitutional 
interventions of 1946, which may have formally emancipated the judiciary 
from the Ministry of Justice but did little to alter its fundamental character.  
There is more than one way to liberate the exercise of judicial review 
from the control of a conservative, self-replicating bureaucracy that prizes 
conformity and orthodoxy over constitutional principle. Some scholars 
have suggested that the power of judicial review be vested in a specialized 
constitutional court that is distinct from the regular judiciary,
170
 an 
approach that has been adopted by many other civil law countries and, 
indeed, is more popular on a global basis than the American-style 
approach of relying upon courts of general jurisdiction.
171
 It is neither 
 
 
 168. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 182–201 (1986). 
 169. Id. at 11–12, 94–96. 
 170. See Matsui, supra note 1, at 1416–19 (discussing proposals that have circulated in Japan for 
the creation of a separate constitutional court). 
 171. See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, in COMP. POL. 217, 223–24 & 
tbl.9.1 (Daniele Caramani ed., 2008) (reporting that countries that have adopted the ―European model‖ 
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necessary nor sufficient, however, to create a separate court in order to 
guarantee the vigorous exercise of judicial review. Regardless of whether 
one creates a separate court with formal autonomy from the regular 
judiciary, a successful reform strategy must also aim to deprive the 
bureaucracy of its power over the personnel and resources needed to 
perform judicial review.  
The stifling influence of the bureaucracy could, in theory, be lifted by 
reforming the existing Supreme Court instead of creating a specialized 
constitutional court. The first problem to be addressed is that of the 
bureaucracy‘s control over the resources available to the Court. As 
explained previously, the Justices are heavily dependent upon law clerks 
who are both obsessed with adherence to precedent and beholden to the 
General Secretariat. Justice Izumi‘s proposal to assign chōsakan to 
individual Justices would obviously ameliorate this problem by providing 
the justices with the resources that they need to question and challenge the 
legal orthodoxy that the bureaucracy fights so hard to maintain.172 Indeed, 
one might go further by eliminating the General Secretariat‘s role in the 
selection of law clerks altogether and enabling the Justices to select clerks 
who are not necessarily career judges. Such a reform would give the 
Justices the opportunity to select law clerks who reflect their own values 
and priorities, as opposed to those of the bureaucracy. 
The second problem to be addressed is that of the membership of the 
Court. As Justice Izumi observes, the appointment of at least three 
constitutional law or public law scholars to the Court at any given time—
one for each of the three petty benches—would both enhance the Court‘s 
substantive expertise in constitutional matters and ensure that such matters 
are ―vigorous[ly] debate[d].‖173 Justice Izumi‘s view that public law 
scholars would enhance the quality and quantity of debate is supported, 
moreover, by empirical evidence: law professors have a proven track 
record of intellectual independence, as evidenced by the fact that a 
disproportionately large share of the Court‘s concurring and dissenting 
opinions are authored by those Justices who hail from legal academia.174 
One might also add that, absent such expertise and debate, sensitive 
constitutional issues are too likely to be resolved in practice by law clerks, 
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or chōsakan, handpicked by the bureaucracy for their preoccupation with 
fidelity to precedent.175 
The appointment of any number of public law scholars to the Court 
may be for naught, however, if the responsibility for selecting such 
candidates remains in the hands of the judicial bureaucracy. Whereas it is 
generally understood that the appointment of private attorneys to the Court 
is to proceed on the basis of input from Japan‘s various bar associations,176 
there is no comparable institutional or procedural constraint on the 
bureaucracy when it comes to the selection of the Court‘s lone law 
professor.177 Thus, as a practical matter, the bureaucracy is free to select 
the most conservative law professor that it can find, in any field of its 
choosing.  
Accordingly, it is necessary to devise an institutional mechanism for 
identifying potential Supreme Court nominees that is largely or wholly 
independent of the Chief Justice and General Secretariat. The Cabinet 
must develop or acquire an independent capacity to identify and assess 
judicial candidates. Along these lines, Justice Izumi suggests the creation 
of a ―selection committee,‖ ―consisting of judges, prosecutors, private 
attorneys, and scholars,‖ that would have responsibility for advising the 
Cabinet on all appointments to the Court.178 Such a comprehensive 
overhaul of the selection system would be desirable for a number of 
reasons, not least of all that it might break the bureaucracy‘s grip over the 
membership of the Court—provided, of course, that the members of the 
committee are not themselves selected by the Chief Justice or General 
Secretariat, and that the judges and prosecutors do not dominate the 
committee.  
If the creation of an independent selection committee proves too 
ambitious, a more incremental approach might be to institute a selection 
process for law professors that parallels the one already in place for private 
attorneys by vesting the selection of candidates in a professional 
organization of legal academics or consortium of law schools. Just as each 
of Japan‘s leading bar associations currently feels entitled to some form of 
quota-based representation on the Court,179 it is plausible to imagine a 
system in which Japan‘s leading law schools would be informally entitled 
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on a rotating basis to fill Supreme Court vacancies. Indeed, an 
authoritative association of law schools or law professors could help to 
bring about such a system on its own initiative. By publicizing its own list 
of the most qualified candidates for the Supreme Court, such an 
organization could put subtle pressure upon the judiciary to choose from 
that list in order to avoid criticism or disapproval. Recommendations of 
this type would not necessarily have to be formally binding in order to be 
effective as a practical matter. To depart altogether from the list of 
recommended candidates would risk the appearance of ignoring expert 
consensus for no obvious reason and instead selecting judges on nakedly 
political or ideological grounds. And by all accounts, Japan‘s senior 
judges do care about appearances.  
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